Tag Archive for: water ingress

Major Win for Bodies Corporate: Direct Right to Pursue Builders Confirmed

QLD

When water leaks or defects appear in a new building, one of the first questions lot owners ask is whether their body corporate can take action against the builder—especially when the body corporate wasn’t a party to the original construction contract. For years in Queensland, bodies corporate have sued builders directly, but there has always been uncertainty about whether this was technically allowed. That uncertainty has now been resolved.

In the case of Body Corporate for Westmark Milton CTS 49024 v Devine Constructions Pty Ltd [2026] QSC 9 (27 January 2026), the Supreme Court of Queensland delivered a clear and significant answer. A body corporate can bring contractual claims in its own name. It does not need to include the original developer, even if the developer has no interest in the case or no longer exists. This is an important clarification for bodies corporate, managers and the entire strata sector.

Who can take action when defects appear in a new building?

The Westmark Milton development was constructed under a 2014 contract between the developer, Walker and Devine Constructions. When the scheme was established in 2016, the body corporate came into existence.

In 2017, after a significant rain event, water leaked into 53 lots. Westmark alleged defects in the common property and commenced legal proceedings against Devine in 2023. Because it wasn’t a party to the original building contract, it relied on section 36(3) of the BCCM Act, which says the body corporate becomes “subrogated to the rights of the original owner” under any pre‑establishment contract relating to common property.

Devine argued that the body corporate had to sue the builder in the name of the developer or include the developer as a party in the case.

Westmark disagreed. It asked the Court to confirm that the body corporate could bring the claim in its own name, without needing the developer involved.

Did the body corporate need the developer to sue the builder?

Devine (the builder) argued “subrogation” is a technical legal concept. Under that concept, a subrogated party (the body corporate) must sue in the name of the original claimant (the developer). Therefore, Westmark had to include the developer.

Westmark (the body corporate) argued that the BCCM Act is designed to give bodies corporate practical control over common property. The word “subrogated” in this context was meant to operate as a statutory transfer of rights, not a technical limitation. Requiring the developer to be a party to a case would undermine the BCCM Act’s purpose and cause unnecessary cost and delay.

What the court decided about the body corporate’s right to sue

Justice Ryan agreed with Westmark.

The Court held that, in this context, “subrogated” was not used in its technical legal sense. Instead, section 36(3) of the BCCM Act transfers the original owner’s contractual rights to the body corporate. The body corporate can enforce those rights in its own name.

There is no requirement to include the developer, even if the developer has no ongoing role or has ceased to exist.

The Court granted Westmark the declaration it sought and dismissed Devine’s summary judgment application.

Why this decision matters for bodies corporate and managers

  1. Developers are often dissolved, disinterested or hard to locate. This decision removes the obstacle of including them in building defect cases if they are not required.
  2. Bodies corporate have long brought defect claims as the plaintiff in their own name, and this decision confirms that they are legally entitled to do so.
  3. This decision reduces cost, delay and procedural complexity for bodies corporate pursuing defect claims.

Body corporate managers frequently support committees with building defect claims. This decision provides clarity by confirming that a body corporate does have the legal right (“standing”) to bring such claims in its own name, reducing the risk of disputes about whether the committee is entitled to take action.

Summary

The Westmark Milton decision confirms that a body corporate can take a builder to court directly in its own name for defects affecting common property, even if the body corporate wasn’t part of the original construction contract and even if the developer has since disappeared. By concluding that the concept of subrogation and the phrase “subrogated to” is used in the context of section 36(3) of the BCCM Act as transferring the rights of the original owner to the body corporate, the Court has removed a major source of uncertainty. Bodies corporate, committees and managers can now pursue defect claims with greater confidence, fewer procedural hurdles and without the cost or delay of involving a developer who has no ongoing role.

 

Written by Peter Waller, Special Counsel, Grace Lawyers, QLD

 

If you’ve discovered defects in your building and need guidance on bringing a claim, our QLD team can help. Call us on 1300 144 436 for clear, practical legal advice.

Supreme Court Clarifies Major Waterproofing Defects and the Duty under the DBPA

NSW

For strata managers dealing with persistent building defects, limitation periods and uncertain liability, the Supreme Court’s decision in Strata Plan 92183 v Samdora Pty Ltd [2026] NSWSC 406 is a significant development. The judgment provides valuable guidance on when waterproofing and drainage issues may be classified as “Major Defects” under the Home Building Act (HBA), while also reinforcing the obligations of builders and nominated supervisors under the Design and Building Practitioners Act 2020 (NSW) (DBPA). The case offers important lessons for managing defect claims, assessing risk and protecting the interests of owners corporations.

Were the waterproofing defects considered major defects?

The case concerned the development of a nine-unit residential building in Mangerton by the Defendants. The case started as many do in NCAT and there was a long history of emails between the parties trying to come to an agreement about what defects the builder agreed to return to rectify. Unfortunately, before the builder managed to complete the rectification work adequately, it fell into administration. The Supreme Court then had to review many “without prejudice” emails to determine what had exactly been “agreed” to and by which parties.

The original agreement for the rectification work dated back to 2019 and, after the disappearance of the builder, the case proceeded in the Supreme Court against the Developer as well as the nominated supervisor of the builder in his personal capacity under the DBPA.

In respect of the HBA claim, it had been agreed between the parties that, due to the age of the building, only claims relating to major defects remained claimable by the Plaintiff (owners corporation). The remaining defects claimed were categorised as “general” and “waterproofing”. The court heard arguments between the parties as to whether these defects, in particular the “waterproofing” defects, were Major Defects.

The definition of what is a “Major Defect” under the HBA is in section 18E which refers to:

“a defect in a major element of a building that is attributable to defective design, defective or faulty workmanship, defective materials, or a failure to comply with the structural performance requirements of the National Construction Code…”

So, what is meant by a “Major Element”?

A “Major Element” is defined by section 18E of the HBA as:

 “…an internal or external load-bearing component of a building that is essential to the stability of the building, or any part of it (including but not limited to foundations and footings, floors, walls, roofs, columns and beams), or a fire safety system, or waterproofing…” and that “… causes, or is likely to cause… the inability to inhabit or use the building (or any part of the building) for its intended purpose, or the destruction of the building or any part of the building, or a threat of collapse of the building or any part of the building”.

The owners corporation’s expert argued that all the hydraulic defects were “waterproofing” and therefore were Major Defects. On behalf of the Defendants, the Court was referred to the NCAT Appeal Panel decision of Ashton v Stevenson [2020] where the Panel, had regard to the fact that the design and purpose of the drainage and bund in an outdoor terrace area was to collect and control rainwater in considering whether it was “waterproofing”. It was submitted by the Defendants that, based upon the Ashton decision, only if both the design and purpose of a defective building element was to prevent water from entering the building, only then could it meet the description of “waterproofing” for the purpose of the HBA. The Court decided that the Panel was not intending to establish a “design and purpose” test rather it was merely undertaking the task of making a factual finding as to whether a particular element is “waterproofing”. Kunc J decided that:

“… an element will be waterproofing if its purpose is to prevent ingress of water into a building. This means that in some cases a particular element may be waterproofing because of how it is deployed and in other cases it will not be waterproofing.”

In this regard, the Court found that the stormwater overland flow path was a Major Defect, as was the rainwater overflow and balcony drainage system. The Court did not accept that actual evidence of water ingress was required.

Negligence under the DBPA: What must be proven?

With respect to the claim against the nominated supervisor of the builder, the Court also gave some clarification as to what needs to be established for a claim in negligence under the DBPA. The judge referred to the general principles of negligence under the Civil Liability Act 2022 (NSW) including that a person is not negligent in failing to take precautions against a risk of harm unless the risk was foreseeable and not insignificant and that in the circumstances a reasonable person in that position would have taken those precautions.

Kunc J referred to the leading High Court decision of Pafburn Pty Ltd v Strata Plan 84674 confirming that the duty was a personal non-delegable duty on the supervisor Mr Nassif and therefore he could not discharge the duty merely by exercising reasonable care in arranging for another person to carry out any work or task within the scope of the duty.

Can a nominated supervisor be personally liable under the DBPA?

The Court went on to find that Mr Nassif had breached his duty under s 37 of the DBPA because he had failed to exercise reasonable care to ensure that the work was relevantly compliant with the statutory warranties in s 18B(1)(c) of the HBA warranting that the work would comply with the warranties or any other law. So, the precaution that he had failed to take against the risk of harm to ensure the work was relevantly compliant was to have properly carried out “an active supervisory role” during the construction process by regular inspections and checking of the work such that the defects would have been identified and rectified prior to the completion of the development. The negligent failure to play an active supervisory role was a necessary condition of the harm because, if he had undertaken that role properly, the harm of the defects and the cost of repairing them would not have arisen because the defects would not be there.

What does active supervision require under the DBPA?

Those acting for Mr Nassif tried to argue that he relied on the fact that other professionals such as the certifier had inspected the building work but did not identify any of the defects however that argument was rejected by the Court and in particular noting that “it is, regrettably, a common experience that buildings for which an occupation certificate had been issued are later found to have defects.” In the same way, it is also regrettably a common argument that because a building has an occupation certificate then it must be free from defects. Unfortunately as we are aware in most cases that is not the reality.

What are the key takeaways for strata managers?

  1. What is or is not a major defect will be a factual finding for the Court or NCAT member to make in any particular case and some particular element may be waterproofing in some cases whereas the exact same thing may not be seen as waterproofing in another case;
  2. A builder can be in breach of its duty under section 37 of the DBPA by failing to reasonably exercise an active supervisory role to ensure that the building complied with the statutory warranties.

Summary

Strata Plan 92183 v Samdora Pty Ltd [2026] NSWSC 406 clarifies when waterproofing and drainage defects may constitute Major Defects under the Home Building Act and confirms that nominated supervisors can be personally liable under the Design and Building Practitioners Act for failing to actively supervise construction works. For strata managers, the decision provides practical guidance on identifying viable defect claims, assessing limitation risks and pursuing recovery against the parties responsible for defective building work.

 

If you would like advice on identifying viable building defect claims and pursuing recovery from developers or other responsible parties, contact Grace Lawyers on 1300 144 436 or enquiries@gracelawyers.com.au

 

Written by Duncan Campbell, Partner and Paul Berrill Special Counsel, Grace Lawyers Building and Construction.

 

Last updated on 14 August 2026

Victorian Supreme Court Redefines Balcony Repair Responsibility in Damjanovski Decision

VIC

This article summarises the recent Supreme Court of Victoria decision in Damjanovski v Owners Corporation 1 Plan No. PS503570D [2026] VSC 656.

The decision is one of the most significant Victorian decisions in recent years and has far-reaching consequences for Owners Corporations, strata managers and lot owners.

The briefing will examine the factual background to the dispute, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the relevant plan of subdivision, the Court’s consideration of the meaning of “interior face”, and the implications of the decision for determining whether balcony waterproofing systems form part of common property or private lot property.

How did the balcony repair dispute arise?

The proceeding concerned a long-running dispute regarding water ingress originating from a fifth-floor balcony within a residential apartment development in Maribyrnong.

Mr Damjanovski purchased the apartment off the plan in 2002. From approximately 2007 water ingress was reported in apartments beneath Mr Damjanovski’s apartment. Expert investigations ultimately determined that water was entering lower lots due to several defects, including but not limited to:

  • the tiled balcony surface;
  • the waterproofing membrane; and
  • the screed beneath the tiles.

The Owners Corporation contended that the balcony floor, including the tiles, waterproof membrane and screed, formed part of Mr Damjanovski’s lot and that he was therefore responsible for repairing and maintaining those components.

Accordingly, Notices to Repair were issued in November 2022 and March 2023 requiring Mr Damjanovski to undertake remediation works to the balcony.

Mr Damjanovski commenced proceedings in VCAT seeking declarations that the Notices to Repair were invalid and that responsibility for the defects rested with the Owners Corporation.

At first instance, VCAT accepted the Owners Corporations’ position and concluded that the boundary of the lot was located at the surface of the structural concrete slab. On that basis, VCAT determined that the tiles, screed and waterproof membrane situated above the slab formed part of Mr Damjanovski’s lot.

Mr Damjanovski appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Victoria.

What laws govern balcony repair responsibility?

The principal legislative provisions considered by the Supreme Court were:

  • sections 4, 46 and 47 of the OCA;
  • sections 48 and 49 of the OCA;
  • section 129 of the OCA;
  • section 12 of the Subdivision Act 1988 (Vic) (SA);
  • the relevant plan of subdivision; and
  • the Subdivision (Procedures) Regulations 2000.

The dispute ultimately centred on the proper interpretation of the plan of subdivision and, the meaning of the notation that boundaries defined by buildings were located at the “interior face” of the building.

What was the Supreme Court decision?

Ultimately, the Supreme Court overturned VCAT’s interpretation of the plan of subdivision.  Specifically, the central issue was whether the expression “interior face” referred to:

  • the surface of the structural concrete slab; or
  • the visible surface of the completed balcony floor.

VCAT adopted the former approach, finding that the structural slab represented the relevant boundary and that everything above it formed part of the lot. Harris J rejected that interpretation.

Her Honour observed that the relevant question was where the boundary lies when a balcony floor consists of multiple building layers, including:

  • a structural concrete slab;
  • screed;
  • waterproof membrane; and

The Court held that “interior face” referred to the interior face of the building itself, being the visible face of the completed building rather than the structural slab lying beneath the finished surface. Harris J stated:

“the better view is that the effect of the Plan of Subdivision is that the concrete slab floor of the Balcony, and the slab, membrane and tiles affixed to it, is common property.”

The Court further held that “the surface of the tiles is the interior face” and concluded that the tiles, waterproof membrane and screed should all be considered common property.

Accordingly, the Court held that:

  • the tiles were common property;
  • the waterproof membrane was common property; and
  • the screed was common property.

Because those building elements were determined to be common property, the Court determined that VCAT had erred in declaring that Mr Damjanovski breached section 129 of the OCA by failing to repair and maintain his lot.

The Court further held that the Notices to Repair could not properly be supported by section 48 of the OCA because that section only applies where repairs are required for a lot owner’s lot.

Why is the Damjanovski decision so important?

This decision is likely to become the leading Victorian authority on the interpretation of interior faces in plans of subdivision prior to 2011.

Perhaps most significantly, the decision substantially undermines the approach previously adopted in Owners Corporation PS508732B v Fisher [2014] VCAT 1358.

In Fisher, VCAT held:

“the interior face of the building means, the interior face of the structure of the building rather than the top surface of whatever is fixed to the structure of the building.”

In Fisher, tiles and waterproofing located above a structural slab were generally treated as lot property.

Harris J expressly rejected that approach.

Her Honour held that:

  • “interior face” refers to the interior face of the building, not the structural slab;
  • the visible completed surface is the relevant reference point;
  • the reasoning in Fisher incorrectly focused on the structural slab rather than the completed building surface; and
  • section 132 of the OCA does not support the proposition that everything attached above a structural slab automatically forms part of a lot.

Notwithstanding the above, the Court also reinforced the relevance of the benefit principle.  Although the balcony floor components were found to be common property, the Court noted that repair expenditure may nevertheless be recoverable from a benefiting owner pursuant to sections 24 and 49 of the OCA.

Which owners corporations are affected?

Notwithstanding the above, the decision is likely to have limited application to plans of subdivision registered after 2011. A significant feature of the dispute was that the relevant plan used “interior face” without being properly defined.

Since 2011, certainty has been provided by the Subdivision (Registrar’s Requirements) Regulations 2011 and, subsequently, the Subdivision (Registrar’s Requirements) Regulations 2021. Regulation 10(4)(a) now expressly provides that an “Interior Face”:

“lies along the interior face of any wall, floor (upper surface of elevated floor if any), ceiling (underside of suspended ceiling if any), window, door or balustrade of the relevant part of the building and any internal coverings, waterproof membranes and fixtures attached to walls, floors, and ceilings are included within the relevant parcel“.

Accordingly, while Damjanovski is now the leading authority concerning the interpretation of pre-2011 plans containing “interior face” notations, its broader application to plans governed by the 2011 and 2021 Regulations is limited.

What does Damjanovski mean for future balcony repair disputes?

There is now inconsistent interpretation of “interior face” notations in plans registered before and after 2011, which leads to uncertainty regarding the ownership of building elements and responsibility for their repair and maintenance, which should be consistent.

The practical significance of Damjanovski is that it challenges a number of assumptions regarding the ownership and maintenance of balcony floor systems in Victorian Owners Corporations.

For plans of subdivision registered prior to 2011 which utilise “interior face” notations, the decision provides strong authority that balcony floor systems, including tiles, waterproof membranes and screed, may constitute common property rather than lot property.

Importantly, Owners Corporations and managers should not assume that responsibility for balcony waterproofing rests with the lot owner simply because the balcony is attached to, or exclusively used by, that lot. Rather, the starting point must always be a careful examination of the relevant plan of subdivision to determine the location of the boundary between lot property and common property.

Despite the Court’s finding that the balcony floor components were common property, Damjanovski also confirms the continuing importance of the benefit principle. Owners Corporations should remember that ownership of an asset and liability for the cost of repairing that asset are separate questions. Even where works relate to common property, sections 24 and 49 of the OCA may permit costs to be allocated to a particular lot owner where the works are undertaken wholly or substantially for the benefit of that lot.

Accordingly, the decision is unlikely to eliminate disputes concerning balcony repairs. Rather, future disputes are likely to focus on two separate issues:

  1. whether the relevant building element forms part of common property or the lot; and
  2. if the element is common property, whether the cost of repair should be borne wholly or predominantly by a benefiting lot owner under the benefit principle.

Subject to any appeal, Owners Corporations and managers should carefully consider the implications of Damjanovski when determining responsibility for balcony repairs and associated costs and to seek legal advice for plans of subdivision registered prior to 2011.

 

If you require guidance on the impact of Damjanovski or responsibility for balcony repairs under your plan of subdivision, please contact the Victorian Grace Lawyers strata team at enquiries@gracelawyers.com.au or 1300 144 436.

 

Written by Leila Idris, Partner, and Christopher Oster, Special Counsel, Grace Lawyers

 

 

Last updated on 26 October 2026