Tag Archive for: short term accommodation

Appeal tribunal upholds a by-law banning short term letting

The Fairway Island appeal.

You have been told time and time again that a body corporate cannot make a by-law banning short term letting or Airbnb within its strata community.

But a strata community we have been working with closely for almost two years put in place a by-law prohibiting lettings of less than one month as a means of protecting the special residential amenity of their community.

The by-law was overturned when the lot owner challenged it in the Commissioner’s Office.  The strata community was successful in its appeal, and its by-law has been validated.

The reasons given by the appeal tribunal give a most compelling case for why a body corporate’s power to make by-laws is robust, and rightly so.

What happened?

The by-law relevantly provided:

“…each proprietor shall not use or permit his lot to be used other than as a private residence of the proprietor or for accommodation of the proprietor’s guests and visitors. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the proprietor may rent out his lot from time to time provided that in no event shall any individual rental for a period of less than one (1) month.”

The by-law was made by one of those rare bodies corporate, Fairway Island, still governed by the Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980 (Qld) (BUGTA).

Similar to the position under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (BCCMA), a BUGTA body corporate has the power to make by-laws to regulate the use and enjoyment of a lot.

The fundamental focus for this body corporate was to impose restrictions on the use of lots in order to protect the special residential amenity of its community.

At first instance, a referee (the BUGTA equivalent of an adjudicator) simply found that the by-law offended a provision of BUGTA that provided that a by-law cannot prohibit or restrict a lease or other dealing with a lot.  The referee followed the way that many other referees and adjudicators had applied the same provision in the BCCMA, such as in Washingtonia [2018] QBCCMCmr 256:

“…a by-law that purports to prevent a lot from being rented for a term of less than 6 months, or more than twice in one year to different tenants, would operate to ‘restrict’ a ‘lease’ of that lot.”

The body corporate argued that the referee’s interpretation of this statutory provision was wrong, and that short term letting did not amount to a ‘lease’ that would be protected by that provision.  The appeal tribunal, presided over by a Magistrate, agreed.

The real task for judging the validity of a by-law is to consider what its true intent is and the purpose for its creation in the context in which it was made, when deciding whether it is within power.  The Magistrate said:

“Here the lots are undoubtedly established with a view to privacy and amenity. That much can be gleaned by the presence of a security gate to the entry of a luxury cluster of houses effectively surrounded by a moat and acres of private golf course. Presumably this inspired the name – Fairway Island. The true character of the by-law is to ensure that only people who have some longer term commitment to the premises occupy them. That is, they are residents there and subject to some longer term control over their behaviour.”

Impact on the strata industry

This does not mean that every body corporate is in the clear to make a by-law banning short term letting – that approach would misapply the reasoning of the Magistrate and the other authorities he was persuaded by.  Great care must be taken on how this decision can be applied to community titles schemes subject to the BCCMA.

What is exciting about this decision is the considered views the Magistrate gave to why Parliament has given bodies corporate the power to make by-laws, and the purpose that by-laws are intended to achieve.

Adjudicators, and even QCAT when dealing with appeals, have adopted conservative approaches to the power to make by-laws.  By-laws are often invalidated for being unreasonable, and many strata communities are left with a sense of futility in making a by-law that can be of any meaningful effect.

Committees are regularly told that it is unreasonable to assume that a dog will cause a nuisance by barking, or that the creation of a large deck will be used to hold noisy parties.  The Magistrate made these helpful and common sense statements:

“It appears to me that BUGTA intended to allow the BC to pass by-laws to protect lot owners from even a hypothetical nuisance of the occupier of a lot. They need not wait until a marching band starts rehearsals at midnight in one lot to ban such an activity. The requirement to get approval for a pet is a standard by-law. This is based on no evidence whatsoever that any particular animal is a problem but on the potential for one to be….

…Regulation is not just about stopping proven past behaviours from repeating but also about preventing anticipated breaches based on experience elsewhere or common sense. Likewise regulations need not be limited to just preventing certain noise during certain hours but may in principle act to eliminate the source of some potential problems altogether. The response must be appropriate but there is no need to wait until a problem has actually manifested before addressing it.”

The Magistrate looked abroad to other ways that laws are made to mitigate the risk of problems occurring, even if there is no guarantee that the problem will in fact occur:

“A simple example from the traffic laws illustrates the regulatory response to some problems can be aimed at certainty and ease of enforcement rather than a case-by-case nuanced application of a broader law. Not all drivers at 0.05% BAC will be affected the same way. But it is having that concentration in the blood that is made an offence, not driving badly. Parliament targets the risk that the use of the road by such persons is best regulated by keeping them off the road.”

Parliament gave bodies corporate the power to make by-laws for good reason: local, state and federal governments do not want to decide what the pool opening and closing hours will be for a particular strata community.  It’s a matter that lot owners can decide upon amongst themselves.

That is why bodies corporate are regularly referred to as the fourth tier of government.  A body corporate is responsible for the management and administration of the lots and common property within their community, and they are given the power to make by-laws to discharge that responsibility effectively.

Lessons to be learnt

One of my biggest criticisms of the BCCMA is the way in which it gave bodies corporate the power to make by-laws with one hand, but then with the other hand seemingly ‘watered down’ that power by imposing so many restrictions on what a by-law cannot do.[1]

This has been compounded by more than two decades of adjudications out of the Commissioner’s Office in which a decision-maker that has never visited the strata community, let alone made the significant decision to purchase or reside in a lot within that community, deciding whether the by-law is reasonable.

If an overwhelming majority of voters decide to impose a particular by-law upon their community, why should adjudicators, referees or a minority of owners be empowered to invalidate it?  The circumstances should be very limited.

Bodies corporate should be able to make by-laws to set and enforce the values, expectations and rules that the majority consider to be appropriate to properly define their community.  The Magistrate made these salient comments:

“In principle there is no reason why a group of people could not set up a highly regulated small community in a way that made it attractive to themselves or likeminded purchasers.

A group of allergy suffers might want to establish a community in which certain plants or animals are prohibited. The ability of a community to govern itself (requiring a 75% majority) would enable the benefits of group titles to extend beyond simply being small lots that share common property.”

Where to from here?

This decision is still within the period in which it could be appealed.  But irrespective of whether it is appealed, the Magistrate’s robust decision should influence how referees, adjudicators and strata communities view the power to make by-laws and the limited circumstances in which they should be invalidated.

This case has so far turned on the considered way Fairway Island crafted the by-law that was ultimately challenged, and the purpose the by-law was intended to serve.  This was not a body corporate that commissioned a law firm to cheaply provide it with a by-law from a suite of precedents in the hope that what was seemingly suitable for hundreds of other communities might be suitable for theirs.

This considered approach to managing a unique strata community stands as best practice within the industry.  It also reflects one of our core values: we want to help create and foster harmonious communities, even though it will not always be smooth sailing.  Please watch this video if you would like to learn more on this: https://gracelawyers.com.au/what-is-strata/

[1] For example, see section 180 of the BCCMA: a by-law cannot restrict the type of residential use of a lot, it cannot discriminate between types of occupiers, it cannot impose a monetary liability on owners or occupiers, and it cannot be oppressive or unreasonable.

Landlords on notice over noisy tenants

Come in and feel the noise: landlords to pay for rowdy tenants.
Photocopies stickytaped to city lamp posts offering dirtcheap, shared-room rentals in luxury apartments could soon be a thing of the past after a landmark court ruling. Previously, landlords who crammed partying backpackers and students into houses and apartments could ignore complaints about noise, passing them back to tenants who changed so often no one could be held responsible. But in a gamechanging move, a noise-abatement order has been served on the owners, rather than their tenants, of a Double Bay apartment. The downstairs neighbours had  complained for years of noise and disturbance.
Anyone breaching a noise-abatement order can face fines of up to $5500 as well as charges of contempt of court that could lead to jail terms.
For Jean Whittlam, 71, and her son Anthony, 41, the noiseabatement order marks the end of a five-year battle with the owners of the apartment above their flat in New South Head Road, Double Bay.
”We’ve been told this is the first time anything like this has ever happened,” said Mr Whittlam, who said the upstairs flat had been run as a backpacker flophouse. ”It’s great … It gives all of us hope.”
Landlords John and Sarah Hanna, who own more than 100 properties in the eastern suburbs, denied the allegation.
”It’s an insult to call the tenants of this flat backpackers,” Mrs Hanna, 76, said. ”They were educated people from good families who just happened to be English and Irish.”
However, Jean Whittlam claimed in court that the Hannas’ tenants were often shouting and singing at night, slamming doors, playing soccer at 2am, swearing, partying and playing loud music.
The Hannas’ lawyer disputed that the owners could limit the noise because they did not live in the apartment, but the magistrate, Harriet Grahame, ruled they were responsible because they could control who they leased the apartment to, for how long and, if necessary, make physical changes to the property to decrease noise.
Colin Grace, of Grace Lawyers, whose firm represented the Whittlams, said this was a landmark decision. ”It means if a landlord has been told about a problem with their tenants but does nothing about it they effectively ‘adopt’ the problem and are responsible for it.”
Recent changes in the tenancy laws allowing landlords to demand written consent before tenants can sublet mean owners have even less excuse for not knowing who lives in a property.
The case was won by Peter Ton.

The only strata community in Queensland that has banned short term letting

Fairway Island: the only strata community in Queensland that has banned short term letting

Six months ago a decision by a Magistrate was released which upheld the validity of a by-law that prohibited lots within its strata community from being let for one month or less.  Our article on that decision is accessible here.

The story caught the attention of every major news source in Queensland.  The industry’s excitement over the possibility of this decision setting a precedent for all strata communities was placated by the realisation that the by-law applied to a body corporate that was not governed by the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (the BCCMA), so it would only be of immediate assistance to a select few strata communities still governed by much older legislation.

It was not necessarily the fact that this decision was made that held everyone’s attention.  It was the feeling of futility most were left with when they realised that a judicial decision-maker saw nothing unreasonable or oppressive in a by-law banning short term letting while the BCCMA did not provide the same sensible power to most bodies corporate in Queensland.

The Magistrate’s decision was appealed by the lot owners.  We suspect most in the industry thought it was an anomaly to an otherwise consistent stream of decisions over the last ten years all holding that a by-law cannot restrict short term letting.

On 27 April 2020, His Honour Judge Barlow QC of the District Court of Queensland delivered his decision dismissing the lot owners’ appeal and upholding the validity of the by-law.  This comes only two weeks after NSW legislation took effect allowing an owners corporation to prohibit most forms of short term letting by special resolution.

When will Queensland catch up?

The by-law

The by-law relevantly provided:

“…each proprietor shall not use or permit his lot to be used other than as a private residence of the proprietor or for accommodation of the proprietor’s guests and visitors. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the proprietor may rent out his lot from time to time provided that in no event shall any individual rental for a period of less than one (1) month.”

The by-law was made by one of those rare bodies corporate, Fairway Island, still governed by the Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980 (Qld) (BUGTA).

Similar to the position under the BCCMA, a BUGTA body corporate has the power to make by-laws to regulate the use and enjoyment of a lot.

The fundamental focus for this body corporate was to impose restrictions on the use of lots in order to protect the special residential amenity of its community.

At first instance, a referee (the BUGTA equivalent of a BCCMA adjudicator) simply found that the by-law offended a provision of BUGTA that provided that a by-law cannot prohibit or restrict a lease or other dealing with a lot.  The referee followed the way that many other referees and adjudicators had applied the same provision in the BCCMA, such as in Washingtonia [2018] QBCCMCmr 256:

“…a by-law that purports to prevent a lot from being rented for a term of less than 6 months, or more than twice in one year to different tenants, would operate to ‘restrict’ a ‘lease’ of that lot.”

Fairway Island argued that the referee’s interpretation was wrong because short term letting did not amount to a ‘lease’ that would be protected by that provision.  On 18 October 2019, the appeal tribunal, presided over by his Honour Magistrate Sinclair, agreed.

The District Court’s decision

The lot owners appealed the Magistrate’s decision to the Court of Appeal, who then remitted it for determination by the District Court of Queensland.

On 27 April 2020, His Honour Judge Barlow QC dismissed the appeal and upheld Magistrate Sinclair’s decision: Redman v The Proprietors – Fairway island GTP 107328 [2020] QDC 68.

If there is another appeal, it will be heard by Queensland’s Court of Appeal.

Why can’t BCCMA community titles schemes make the same by-law?

His Honour Judge Barlow QC said:

“I see no reason why, absent any restrictions imposed by other provisions in the Act, it would not entitle a body corporate to make a by-law that regulates a lot owner or occupier in undertaking a wide range of specified activities including, for example, installing a shed or a trampoline in a back yard, smoking or drinking alcohol in or around a lot, or perhaps even leasing or otherwise renting out or allowing the occupation of a lot other than by the owner and the owner’s (or its directors’) immediate family.”

The difficultly for BCCMA schemes is that section 180(3) does not allow a by-law to restrict the type of residential use that can be lawfully made of a lot.  The BUGTA does not have the same restriction.

Judge Barlow QC found that:

“Short-term use of a house by holiday makers or other persons seeking short-term accommodation is different from longer term residential use, even though it may be difficult to draw a clear dividing line. In its ordinary meaning, to use a building for a residential purpose does not include using it for the purpose of letting it out to others (and those others using it) for holidays or other temporary accommodation.”

His Honour could look at the ordinary meaning of those words because they were not defined in the BUGTA or the by-laws.  That is different to the approach taken by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) in Body Corporate for Hilton Park v Robertson [2018] QCATA 168, where it was held that the legislature had intended that the term ‘residential’ under the BCCMA would include holiday letting and/or short term accommodation.

There is another interesting point of difference between Fairway Island and Hilton Park.

In substantially the same way, section 180(4) of the BCCMA and section 30(6) of the BUGTA provide that a by-law cannot restrict a dealing with a lot.

In the Fairway Island decisions, the appellate tribunal and court found that holiday letting is not a lease (a form of a dealing), and that a by-law does not restrict a lease if it is simply imposing conditions on a lease.

In Hilton Park, QCAT found that holiday letting is a form of a lease, and that imposing a restriction on holiday letting would contravene section 180(4) of the BCCMA.

In Fairway Island, it was successfully argued that a ‘dealing’ is a type of transaction effected by registration under the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), a short-term letting arrangement is not registrable, and the by-law only imposes conditions on, but does not prevent, possible dealings.  The reasons in Hilton Park do not reveal these same arguments being put to QCAT.

A court and a tribunal can hardly be criticised for not agreeing with an argument not put before it.

But a fresh perspective on whether short term letting is a lease will not overcome whether short term accommodation is a type of residential use that a by-law restricts or prohibits.  That is the challenge for BCCMA schemes.

Where to from here?

When we last wrote about the Fairway Island decision handed down by the appeal tribunal constituted by Magistrate Sinclair (accessible here), it was met by a wave of articles and commentary from other law firms calling it irrelevant to BCCMA schemes and saying it will not have any impact on the wider strata industry in Queensland.

Most would have advised Fairway Island that it would be futile to make a by-law restricting short term letting because a referee would invalidate it, as referees and adjudicators had already done in numerous prior decisions on the belief that it would amount to a restriction on a lease.  In our view, the District Court’s decision in Fairway Island has authoritatively determined at short term letting is not a ‘lease’ or a ‘dealing’ for the purposes of section 30(6) of the BUGTA, and this should be applied by adjudicators interpreting section 180(4) of the BCCMA because the commonalities of these provisions has already been noted and relied upon.

While it may be convenient to dismiss the Fairway Island decisions as being irrelevant because they do not deal with the BCCMA, the same could have been said about O’Connor v Proprietors, Strata Plan No 51 [2018] 4 WLR 22 where the Privy Council upheld the validity of a short-term letting by-law made in the Turks and Caicos Islands as a means of protecting residential use within a condominium development.  The O’Connor decision inspired the arguments led for Fairway Island.

The law is fluid.  Those who practice in the law must also be fluid.  If circumstances do not arise within BCCMA communities to see a challenge to the conventional thinking laid out in Hilton Park, then legislative change is required.

In early April 2020, legislative change occurred in New South Wales that allows an owners corporation to pass a special resolution to restrict forms of short term lettings within their strata community.

Short term letting, Air Bnb, holiday making – however else we wish to describe it – is a serious concern within strata communities that predominately consist of lots used for a long-term residential purpose.  Hitherto, the conventional thinking has been that bodies corporate should simply enforce by-laws to address the nuisance short term letting can cause to the rest of the community when the problems arise, and that it is unreasonable of them to make by-laws based on ‘hypothetical’ concerns.

His Honour Magistrate Sinclair made these helpful comments on the topic in his decision that the District Court upheld on appeal:

“It appears to me that BUGTA intended to allow the BC to pass by-laws to protect lot owners from even a hypothetical nuisance of the occupier of a lot. They need not wait until a marching band starts rehearsals at midnight in one lot to ban such an activity. The requirement to get approval for a pet is a standard by-law. This is based on no evidence whatsoever that any particular animal is a problem but on the potential for one to be….

…Regulation is not just about stopping proven past behaviours from repeating but also about preventing anticipated breaches based on experience elsewhere or common sense. Likewise regulations need not be limited to just preventing certain noise during certain hours but may in principle act to eliminate the source of some potential problems altogether. The response must be appropriate but there is no need to wait until a problem has actually manifested before addressing it.”

The Fairway Island decisions do much more than deal with the validity of a by-law restricting short term letting.  The arguments ventilated within this litigation and the detailed reasoning of Magistrate Sinclair and Judge Barlow QC reveal the core purpose of by-laws: to enable bodies corporate to regulate activities within their strata community to enhance the use and enjoyment of the properties in that community.

If the proper interpretation of the BCCMA is that a strata community that predominately consists of long term residents cannot make a by-law to stop a small handful of lots from being used for short term letting, then the legislation needs to change.

Grace Lawyers is pleased to have acted for Fairway Island throughout the course of this litigation.  You can learn more about our unique approach to strata law here.

Is unlawful short term accommodation use of residential lots contributing to the SEQ housing crisis?

One of the most vexing issues in Queensland’s strata industry is the compatibility of short-term holiday accommodation with long-term residential living.  A prominent building in South Brisbane that was developed for long-term residential living became the latest battleground for this industry issue.

 

Background

The scheme’s management rights operator filed an application in the Planning & Environment Court to challenge whether it needed body corporate consent to make a development application to change the use of dozens of the lots in the scheme to regularise their use for short-term accommodation (as a hotel).

To put the proceeding in context – the management rights operator had asked for body corporate consent to its intended development application and been refused.  Brisbane City Council refused to acknowledge that the development application was properly made without body corporate consent, so the management rights operator brought the application in the P&E Court.

The 274 residential lots in the building could be used for “Multi-Unit Dwelling”: a use of premises as a principal place of longer term residence by several discrete households, domestic groups or individuals irrespective of building form.

The management rights operator argued that body corporate consent was not needed because the proposed use of common property that is incidental to short-term accommodation is consistent with ordinary uses and established functions.  In other words – the common property is going to be used in substantially the same way irrespective of whether lots in the scheme or occupied for long or short periods.  People will still be walking through the common hallways and foyers, they will still swim in the pool, and they will still park their car, irrespective of whether they will be in the unit for a short or long period.

The proceedings were initially filed by the management rights operator against the Brisbane City Council. Given the potentially dire impacts of the decision on the Body Corporate, Grace Lawyers was engaged  by the body corporate to join the proceeding and lead evidence about the significant and undesirable impact this hotel business run by the management rights operator was having on their community.

 

Outcome

In Spice Apartments Residential Management Pty Ltd ATF SARM Trust v Brisbane City Council [2023] QPEC 2, the Court dismissed the management rights operator’s application because short term accommodation results in a different and more intense use of common property, so body corporate consent is needed for the development application

The Court found at [10]:

I am satisfied on the facts before me that the conducting of the Short-term accommodation use by the applicant has resulted in not only a material intensification of the use of the common property but also damage to the common property in a way that is unlikely to have occurred had this use not been (apparently unlawfully) conducted on the land. It is the Short-term accommodation use that attracts people in large numbers who bring luggage, and require clean linen for a brief period. They are the people who may require extra beds in their units during their stay. They appear to regularly include individuals who do not care where they park, how much noise they make and whether they upset residents of the buildings. They are, on the evidence before me, a demographic regularly looking for a good time, in circumstances where they are not staying for a long time.

Grace Lawyers previously wrote about whether a body corporate can restrict the long or short term use of a lot back in 2020. We explored the importance of a scheme’s development approval, explained that the use of a lot in contravention of that approval is an offence, and cautioned that an approval could be amended by applying for a material change of use.

That is what was attempted in Spice Apartments.  However, the body corporate acted in a considered and strategic way over several years to preserve the amenity of its long-term residential building.

 

Wider application

Many may read the Spice Apartments decision and find its conclusion unsurprising – short-term holiday use of a lot is very different to long-term residential use of a lot.  That was also a key component of the District Court’s decision in Redman v The Proprietors – Fairway Island GTP 107328 [2020] QDC 68 at [45]:

Short-term use of a house by holiday makers or other persons seeking short-term accommodation is different from longer term residential use, even though it may be difficult to draw a clear dividing line. In its ordinary meaning, to use a building for a residential purpose does not include using it for the purpose of letting it out to others (and those others using it) for holidays or other temporary accommodation.

You can read more about the Fairway Island decision here.

So why can’t bodies corporate take more direct and effective action to regulate and prevent short-term use of lots in their scheme?

Section 180(3) of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (BCCMA) provides that if a lot may lawfully be used for residential purposes, then a body corporate cannot restrict the type of residential use.  The prevailing and authoritative view of this section is that short term accommodation is a “type of residential use”, at least under the BCCMA: Body Corporate for Hilton Park v Robertson [2018] QCATA 168.

Yes, I appreciate that seems rather confusing.  But the ordinary meanings of words used in legislation give way to the statutory context in which they are used.

 

Current challenges

If Queenslanders want “residential” to mean the same thing in community titles schemes governed by the BCCMA as it does in any other context to enable bodies corporate to make by-laws restricting short-term accommodation, then:

  • the legislation needs to change; or
  • a body corporate governed by the BCCMA needs to be ready and willing to make a by-law restricting short-term accommodation use of a lot in its scheme and then defend it all the way to Queensland’s Court of Appeal, hoping a different conclusion is reached.

The Queensland Government has commissioned a review of the BCCMA through the Community Titles Working Group to ensure the legislation continues to meet the needs of residents and other stakeholders in strata communities.  So, there is a real opportunity to legislative change.

South East Queensland is currently experiencing a housing crisis.  Addressing the unlawful use of lots for short-term accommodation will be one immediate way to provide some relief for this crisis.  Correcting the misuse of units developed for long-term residential purposes will increase the stock available for ordinary Queenslanders who are struggling to find a home, let alone an affordable one.

 

FAQs

  • Spice Apartments is a body corporate governed by the BCCMA. How was it able to stop short-term letting if the BCCMA says short-term accommodation is a type of “residential” use?

The BCCMA says that about a body corporate’s ability to make a by-law.  The use of a lot in any community titles scheme is still subject to the scheme’s development approval.  So instead of focusing on the by-laws, a body corporate could instead focus on enforcing the scheme’s development approval or asking the local government to enforce it.

  • How can I find out what my scheme’s development approval says?

Start by getting a copy of the scheme’s development approval.  That could be done through the local government’s online search portal (PD Online), paying for a planning certificate, or getting a copy from the body corporate’s records (if it holds it).  Then take legal or planning advice on the uses that are permitted.

  • Why was Fairway Island able to introduce a by-law to restrict short term accommodation?

Fairway Island is governed by the Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980 (Qld), not the BCCMA. Different legislation, different outcome.

  • If a lot in our scheme can only be used under the development approval for long-term residential purposes, how is body corporate consent obtained to apply for a material change in use to allow short-term accommodation?

You ask for it by submitting a motion.  Subject to what is on the register of reserved issues, the committee may be able to give that consent.

  • We are confident that the development approval only allows lots to be used for long-term residential purposes, and our committee will never consent to someone applying for a change to the local government. What can be done to maintain that position?

Maintain your positions on the committee in perpetuity and be ready to lobby against any motion submitted to a general meeting for that consent to be provided to a MCU application.  But in reality – times change, people change, priorities change and committees change.  So a long-term strategy needs to be implemented to guard against a hole in the net.  It starts with making it a restricted issue for a committee to decide whether to give body corporate consent to a change application.

  • Lots in our scheme can be lawfully used for long and short term accommodation. The holiday-makers can be problematic.  Is there nothing that can be done?

There remain many options.  Some by-laws can be put in place to better regulate, without restricting, short term accommodation.  A body corporate can also work closely with its management rights operator to address the issue.  A benefit of resident management rights is that the operator is onsite to address issues as they arise.